The Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy?  The Panel  Evidence from Egypt by Shokr, Mohamed Aseel et al.
255
Gadjah Mada International Journal of  Business – September-December, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2014
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business
Vol. 16, No. 3 (September-December 2014): 255-274
* Corresponding author’s e-mail: m_aseel1975@yahoo.com
ISSN: 1141-1128
http://journal.ugm.ac.id/gamaijb
The Bank Lending Channel of  Monetary Policy?
The Panel  Evidence from Egypt*
Mohamed Aseel Shokr,ab Zulkefly Abdul Karim,a Mansor Jusoh,a and
Mohd. Azlan Shah Zaidi a
a Faculty of Economics and Management, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), Malaysia
b Faculty of  Commerce, Tanta University, Egypt
Abstract: This paper examines the relevance of  the bank lending channel of  monetary policy in Egypt
using bank-level data. Previous empirical studies in Egypt that used macro-level data have not supported
the relevance of the bank lending channel. However, using a sample of 32 commercial banks for the
period from 1998 until 2011 and a dynamic panel GMM technique, the empirical findings revealed the
relevance of  the bank lending channel of  monetary policy in Egypt. Moreover, there is a heterogeneity
effect of monetary policy on bank loans according to bank size, in which the small banks are more
affected during a monetary contraction than larger banks. This finding signals that the monetary authori-
ties in Egypt should take cognizance of  the stability of  interest rates in order to stabilize the bank loan
supply.
Abstrak: Makalah ini membahas relevansi bank penyalur pinjaman kebijakan moneter/bank sentral di
Mesir dengan menggunakan data bank bertingkat. Beberapa studi empiris sebelumnya yang menggunakan
data tingkat makro belum mendukung relevansi penyaluran pinjaman bank. Namun, dengan menggunakan
sampel dari 32 bank umum dari periode 1998 hingga 2011 dan dengan memakai teknik panel GMM
dinamis, kami menemukan bukti empiris yang menunjukkan adanya relevansi saluran peminjaman bank
kebijakan moneter di Mesir. Selain itu, ada efek heterogenitas kebijakan moneter pinjaman bank sesuai
dengan ukuran bank, di mana pada umumnya bank yang kecil lebih terpengaruh selama kontraksi moneter
dibandingkan dengan bank yang lebih besar. Temuan ini menunjukan bahwa pihak otoritas moneter di
Mesir harus bertanggung jawab atas kestabilan suku bunga agar terjaga kestabilan pasokan pinjaman
bank.
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Introduction
The central banks change  their interest
rate policy, as an intermediate target of  the
monetary policy, to achieve the ultimate tar-
gets of  their monetary policy, namely low in-
flation, full employment, equilibrium in the
balance of payments and sustainability of the
long term economic growth. However, the
effects of interest rates on macroeconomic
variables are often indirect, and do not mani-
fest themselves immediately. This is because
any changes in interest rate policy will influ-
ence the macroeconomic variables through
several monetary policy channels, such as the
credit channel (balance sheet and bank lend-
ing channel), exchange rate channel, equity
price channel, and asset prices channel. For
example, an expansionary monetary policy
through a decrease in interest rates, will raise
the bank reserves, increase the bank loans,
and subsequently will have an important im-
pact on investment and consumption, as well
as output. This indicates the importance of
the bank lending channel in transmitting mon-
etary policy shocks to the real sector activity.
In Egypt’s experience, the banking sector
plays an important role in the domestic
economy by providing funds to the private
sector. For example, the percentage of  do-
mestic credit to the private sector, as a per-
centage of gross domestic product is consid-
ered to be large, at 31.1 percent in 2011,  29.1
percent in 2012, and  27.8 percent in 2013
(World Bank). Therefore, given the important
role of bank credit, it is expected that the
bank lending channel has relevance in Egypt’s
case.
The bank lending channel analyzes the
effects of monetary policy on banks’ balance
sheets to influence the loan supply. An in-
crease in interest rates, as a monetary policy
variable, reduces banks’ reserves, and thus
loans and thereby affects the spending capac-
ity  of borrowers (Bernanke 1992). In the
bank lending channel, monetary policy im-
pacts loans through traditional interest rates
and external finance premiums1. This is be-
cause monetary policy changes the interest
rate levels and the size of the external finance
premium. Changes in traditional interest rates
and external finance premiums have a stron-
ger effect on bank loans than just changes in
the interest rate (Bernanke and Gertler 1995).
The bank lending channel, as a part of the
credit channel, is premised on the fact that
information is asymmetric, banks are hetero-
geneous and banks occupy an important role
in the financial system. However, large banks
are capable of solving the asymmetric infor-
mation problem in the capital  market
(Mishkin 1996).
There are five arguments relating to the
external finance premium in the credit mar-
ket. Firstly, the imperfect information changes
the wedge of costs between internal and ex-
ternal funds, which amplifies the effect of
monetary policy shocks on loans. The imper-
fect information between small and large
banks causes the heterogeneity effect of
monetary policy because large banks have
more information than small banks. Secondly,
the agency cost affects the wedge of costs
between internal and external funds. Small
banks are subject to higher agency costs than
larger banks, which leads to the differences
in behavior between the small and large banks.
Thirdly, the lenders’ expected cost of  the con-
tracts also affects the external finance pre-
mium, such as evaluation, monitoring and
1 The external finance premium is the difference in cost between funds raised externally (by issuing equity and
debt) and funds generated internally (by retaining earnings).
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collection of  the contracts. Fourthly, the cost
of  distortions in borrower’s behavior, such
as collateral requirements, affects the exter-
nal finance premium between small and large
banks. Finally, the bank financial position
impacts the external finance premium. The
greater the bank’s financial position is, the
lower the external finance premium should
be. Since large banks have better a financial
position than small banks, small banks are
more sensitive to monetary policy shocks
than large banks (Bernanke and Gertler 1995;
Walsh 2003).2
Many changes in the banking sector
were affected during the reform program
(ERSAP) in Egypt. These changes aimed at
improving the effects of monetary policy
shocks on the supply of  bank loans. Firstly,
the Central Bank of  Egypt (CBE) liberalized
interest rates and the exchange rate from
1991. Secondly, the government eliminated
interest rate and credit ceilings. The banks
were given the freedom to determine the in-
terest rate on deposits and loans. Thirdly, the
intermediate target of  monetary policy was
changed from the money supply to interest
rates and the operational target of monetary
policy was changed from banks’ excess re-
serves to the overnight interest rate from the
year 2005. Finally, the government privatized
fourteen banks in 1996 to increase competi-
tion and efficiency among the  banks (Omran
2007)3.
Liberalization of interest rates, target-
ing interest rates and privatization of banks
were all envisaged to enhance competition
and efficiency in the banking sector in Egypt.
Competition and efficiency strengthen the
link between monetary policy and macroeco-
nomics variables, and improve the effect of
monetary policy on macroeconomics vari-
ables, especia ll y loans (Shrestha and
Chowdhury 2006). This is because private
banks are deemed to be more efficient than
public banks. Furthermore, the entrance of
foreign banks, which are more efficient than
domestic banks, improves efficiency in the
banking sector as competition forces the do-
mestic banks to develop themselves (Bonin
et al. 2005). In addition, the liberalization of
the banking sector inevitably leads to increases
in productivity and improves the quality of
financial services, financial technology and
human capital (Denizer 1999).
The existing studies in Egypt lend no
credence to the importance of the bank lend-
ing channel. For example, Hassan (2003)
studied the effects of monetary policy on pri-
vate credit using a structural vector auto re-
gression (SVAR) model and found that mon-
etary policy does not have a significant ef-
fect on domestic credit. Similarly, Al-Mashat
and Billmerier (2008) also studied the effects
of monetary policy on bank loans using the
VAR model and found the effects to be insig-
nificant. However, the above mentioned stud-
ies have three defects because they used ag-
gregate data. Firstly, they treat banks as ho-
mogenous, and this leads to biased estima-
tions. Some macro-level studies, such as
Romer et al (1990), Ramey (1993), fail to find
a significant relationship between monetary
policy and loans due to the problems of si-
multaneity and heterogeneity of banks, which
generate biased estimations (Chatelain et al.
2003; Chirinko et al. 1999). The bank lend-
2 Studies by Kashyap and Stein (1995), Abdul Karim et al. (2011) and Kandra (2012) have supported the bank
lending channel and the heterogeneity effect of  monetary policy.
3 The Egyptian banking sector consists of the Central Bank and 40 banks. There are 3 public commercial banks,
27 private & joint venture banks, 7 foreign banks and 3 specialized banks (CBE 2012).
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ing channel might be detected in aggregate
studies as monetary policy affects loans
through changes in bank assets. It is difficult
to distinguish between shifts in the loan sup-
ply and demand when aggregate data is used
(Bernanke 1992). Secondly, these studies
placed emphasis on traditional interest rates
only and did not encompass the credit view
of  monetary policy. Thirdly, they do not high-
light the importance of bank-specific vari-
ables, such as  the size of the banks, their
liquidity and capital, in investigating the re-
sponse of loans to monetary policy shocks
(Bernanke and Gertler 1995).
This study is interested in identifying the
impact of monetary policy on bank loans us-
ing disaggregated data and the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) model to ascer-
tain if the bank lending channel is operative
in Egypt. Secondly, it investigates the impor-
tance of bank-level variables, namely the
banks’ size, liquidity and capital, in analyz-
ing the response of loans to monetary policy
shocks. Thirdly, it examines the effects of
macro level variables, namely output and in-
flation, on bank loans. Finally, it studies the
heterogeneity effect of monetary policy on
bank loans, according to the size of  the banks.
The research contributes to the exist-
ing literature on the bank lending channel of
monetary policy in four ways. Firstly, most
studies are focused on the advanced coun-
tries, while some small studies are carried out
on developing countries. The current study
would extend the existing literature by study-
ing the bank lending channel in Egypt. Sec-
ondly, it improves on the existing studies in
Egypt by examining the effects of  monetary
policy on loans, using disaggregated data and
the GMM technique. Thirdly, it improves on
existing studies in Egypt by treating banks as
heterogeneous. Fourthly, there are no empiri-
cal studies investigating the effects of mon-
etary policy on bank loans in Egypt, using
panel data. Therefore, this research would fill
this gap by studying the bank lending chan-
nel of  monetary policy, using panel data.
Several interesting features emerge from
this paper. Firstly, it supports the significant
effects of monetary policy on bank loans,
using firm-level data. Secondly, it highlights the
significance of the banks’ size, liquidity and
capital in investigating the response of loans
to monetary policy shocks. Thirdly, it supports
the impact of macro-level variables, namely
output and inflation, on banks’ loans. Finally,
it supports the heterogeneity effect of mon-
etary policy on loans, according to the size
of  the banks.
The rest of  this paper is structured as
follows. Section two provides the literature
review of the bank lending channel at macro
and bank level. Section three includes the
theoretical framework. Section four presents
the GMM model and description of the vari-
ables. The Section five provides the empiri-
cal results. Finally, section six offers conclu-
sions and provides some implications.
Literature Review
Empirical studies have given impor-
tance to the bank-lending channel. Some
empirical studies used aggregate data and
others used firm level data. The studies on
the bank lending channel are divided into two
groups, namely macro-level and firm-level
studies.
Evidence of the Bank Lending
Channel: Macro-level Study
Many studies in the United States sup-
port the bank lending channel. For instance,
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) used the com-
modities and credit curve (CC) and liquidity
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and money curve (LM) to investigate the bank
lending channel. They assumed that there are
three assets, namely money, bonds and loans.
Secondly, banks cannot easily replace lost de-
posits with other funds. Thirdly, loans and
bonds are not perfect substitutes. Fourthly, the
central bank influences the supply of loans
by changing the reserve levels. They found
that the Federal Bank affects reserves, de-
posits and loans. In another paper, Bernanke
and Blinder (1992) found that tight monetary
policy reduces deposits and assets and that
most of the decrease in assets are from secu-
rities rather than loans. This is because banks
react to a fall in assets by selling securities in
the short term and reducing loans in the long
term (Bernanke 1992). Kashyap et al (1992)
found that a tight monetary policy reduces
the supply of bank loans because it changes
the mix of loans and commercial papers, by
increasing the percentage of commercial pa-
pers to loans. Driscoll (2004) found that mon-
etary policy shocks have significant effects
on loans.
However, both Romer et al (1990) and
Ramey (1993) argued that the bank lending
channel is not important. Romer et al (1990)
found that a tight monetary policy does not
affect loans. Ramey (1993) also found that
the money channel is more significant than
the credit channel. These objections by Romer
et al (1990) and Ramey (1993) were ad-
dressed by Kashyap and Stein (1995) and
Bernanke and Gertler (1995). According to
Kashyap and Stein (1995), monetary policy
does not affect bank loans as external finance
could be raised with perfect elasticity. Hence
this affects the importance of the bank lend-
ing channel. Bernanke and Gertler (1995)
argued that the existence of the bank lend-
ing channel does not mean that banks are in-
capable of  replacing lost deposits totally. It
is sufficient to require that banks do not face
elastic demand for their open-market liabili-
ties.
Many studies support the bank lending
channel in other countries. Hülsewig et al.
(2006) examined the bank lending channel
in Germany, using aggregate data and the
VAR model. They found that a contraction
in monetary policy decreases bank loans.
Therefore, they verified the importance of the
bank lending channel. In Japan, Hosono
(2006) substantiated the existence of the
bank lending channel, using aggregate data.
In China, Sun et al. (2010) also confirmed
the existence of the bank lending channel of
monetary policy, using aggregate data. In
Chile, Alfaro et al. (2004) supported the im-
portance of the bank lending channel, using
macro-level data.
Evidence of the Bank Lending
Channel: Bank-Level Study
Many studies support the bank lending
channel in the United States, using firm level
data. For instance, Kashyap and Stein (1995)
used disaggregated data, for the period from
1976 to 1992, on loans, securities, deposits
and interest rates. They found that there is a
difference between the response of small and
large banks. A higher interest rate leads to a
significant decrease in small banks’ loans, but
not in large banks’ loans. Therefore, small
banks are more sensitive to monetary policy
shocks than large banks. In another study,
Kashyap and Stein (1994) ascertained the
importance of the bank lending channel, by
using both aggregate and cross-section data.
Kandrac (2012) used the GMM model and
disaggregated data for the period from 1993
to 2008. He found a negative and significant
relationship between interest rates and bank
Shokr et al.
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loans. Also, monetary policy shocks have a
stronger effect on small banks, compared to
large banks.
In the European countries, Kashyap
and Stein (1997) found that the importance
of the bank lending channel varies according
to the countries. In the United Kingdom
(UK), the banking lending channel is weak,
while it is stronger in Italy and Portugal. In
other countries, the banking lending channel
is of  medium importance. Kakes and Sturm
(2002) studied the bank lending channel in
Germany, using disaggregated data and a vec-
tor error-correction model (VECM). They
found that small banks hold relatively large
amounts of liquid assets and reduce loans
after monetary contractions, compared to
large banks. On the other hand, large banks
hold relatively little liquid assets, compared
to small banks and insulate their loans from
monetary policy shocks. Favero et al. (1999)
also affirmed the importance of  the bank
lending channel in France, Germany, Italy and
Spain. De Bondt (1998) further verified the
importance of the bank lending channel in
Europe, which he found to be stronger in
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands and
not as significant in the United Kingdom.
In the European countries, many stud-
ies support the bank lending channel, using
the GMM technique. For instance, Ehrmann
et al. (2002) studied the bank lending chan-
nel in the euro area, using panel data and
GMM techniques. They found that the inter-
est rate influences bank loans in the euro area.
Huang (2003) also used the GMM model and
supported the bank lending channel in the
United Kingdom. Gambacorta (2005) sup-
ported the bank lending channel in Italy us-
ing panel data and the GMM model. He also
confirmed the importance of  liquidity and
capital in the response of loans to monetary
policy shocks. Golodniuk (2006) used panel
data and the GMM model and found that the
higher the capitalization, the less responsive
a bank is  to monetary pol icy shocks.
Jimborean (2009) used the GMM model and
disaggregated data in Central and Eastern
Europe countries, over the period from 1998
to 2006. He found that small banks modify
lending more than large banks, after monetary
policy shocks. It was evident that monetary
policy has a stronger effect on small banks
compared to large banks. In Turkey, Akinci
et al. (2013) used the GMM technique and
panel data, during the period from 1991 to
2007. They found that the bank lending chan-
nel was effective.
In Japan, Hosono (2006) examined the
bank lending channel and supported the ef-
fect of  monetary policy on loans.  During the
banking crisis in the 1990s, expansionary
monetary policy played an important role in
mitigating the negative effects of the crisis,
by providing liquidity to illiquid banks.
Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000) analyzed the
bank lending channel in Japan, based on panel
data set for the period from 1976 to 1995,
and the GMM technique. They found that
small banks are more sensitive to monetary
policy shocks than large banks. In China, Sun
et al. (2010) supported the existence of the
bank lending channel, using aggregate and
disaggregated data and the heterogeneous
behavior between banks’ loans, in response
to monetary policy shocks.
In other counties, many studies support
the importance of the bank lending channel.
In Malaysia, Abdul Karim et al. (2011) ex-
amined the effects of interest rates on bank
loans, using disaggregated data and the GMM
model. They found that interest rate shocks
have a significant influence on bank loans.
Moreover, the banks’ size, liquidity and capi-
talization play an important role in influenc-
ing the response of loans to monetary policy
261
Gadjah Mada International Journal of  Business – September-December, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2014
shocks. In Chile, Alfaro et al. (2004) sup-
ported the significance of the bank lending
channel, using both micro and macro-level
data. In Greece, Brissimis et al. (2001) af-
firmed the significant impact of  monetary
policy on bank loans. The larger banks and
the more liquid banks are able to protect their
loans from monetary policy shocks. In Bra-
zil, Auel and De Mendonça (2011) found a
significant relationship between interest rates
and loans, using the GMM model. In the
emerging economies of Asia, Latin America
and Central and Eastern Europe, Wu et al.
(2011) supported the existence of the bank
lending channel, using the GMM model. In
Mexico, Mora (2013) found that small banks
are more sensitive to monetary policy shocks
than large banks.
Bank Lending Channels in Egypt
In the Egyptian context, the existing
studies used aggregate data to investigate the
bank lending channel. For instance, Hassan
(2003) studied the effect of monetary policy
on private credit, using aggregate data and a
structural vector auto regression model
(SVAR). He found that monetary policy does
not have a significant effect on private credit
(Hassan 2003). In addition, Al-Mashat and
Billmerier (2008) studied the effects of mon-
etary policy on bank loans, using the VAR
model and aggregate data. They found that
the effect of monetary policy on loans is in-
significant (Al-Mashat and Billmeier 2008).
The studies by Hassan (2003) and Al-
Mashat and Billmerier (2008), used aggregate
data to study the bank lending channel. How-
ever, this paper uses panel data and the GMM
model to examine the bank lending channel
in Egypt. In addition, this study highlights
the importance of  firm level variables, namely
the banks’ size, liquidity and capital, in in-
vestigating the response of loans to monetary
policy shocks. It is more suitable to use dis-
aggregated data to examine the bank lending
channel than aggregate data. This is because
using disaggregated data has some advantages.
Firstly, using disaggregated data treats banks
as heterogeneous. Secondly, it encompasses
both the traditional interest rate and the credit
view of  monetary policy. Thirdly, it highlights
the importance of  firm-level variables, such
as the size of banks, and their liquidity and
capital, in investigating the response of bank
loans to monetary policy shocks.
Theoretical Model
The bank lending channel of monetary
policy could be analyzed using a simple model
introduced by Bernanke and Blinder (1988)
and further developed by Ehrmann et al.
(2002). Bernanke and Blinder (1988) as-
sumed that there are three assets: money,
bonds and loans, and banks cannot easily re-
place deposits with other funds. Also that
loans and bonds are not perfect substitutes,
and that the central bank could affect the loan
supply by changing the reserve levels of  the
banks. The loan demand is a function of  the
loans’ interest rate (i
l
), gross national prod-
uct (y) and bonds’ interest rates (p). There-
fore, the equation of loan demand is:
L
d
= a
1
p + a
2
y - a
3
i
1
........................(1)
If the balance sheet of the bank con-
tains four elements, which are deposits, re-
serves, bonds and loans. The next equation
shows the balance sheet at the equilibrium
point.
Total assets = Total liabilities
Loans + Bonds + Reserves= Deposits
D= L + B + R
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Suppose that banks tend to maximize loans
subject to:
L + B + ER= D(1 - rd)
R= ER + RR
where R= Total reserves; ER= excess re-
serves, and RR= required reserves.
Loan supply is a function of the loans’
interest rate (i
l 
), bonds’ interest rates (p), de-
posits (D) and required reserve ratio (d).
Therefore, the equation of the loan supply is
as follows:
L
s
= -b
1
p + b
2
D(1-d) + b
3
i
l
...............(2)
or L
s
= -b
1
p + b
2
D + b
3
i
l
If the market is clear, loan demand equals
loan supply at the equilibrium point.
L
d
= L
s
a
1
p + a
2
y - a
3
i= -b
1
p + b
2
D + b
3
i
l
.........(3)
Ehrmann et al (2002) improved on
Bernanke and Blinder’s (1988) model. They
assumed that deposits (D) equal money (M)
and depended on a monetary policy variable
(interest rates i). Therefore, the equation for
deposits and money is as follows:
M= D= -ai + 
On the assets side, there are loans (L)
and securities (S). On the liabilities side, there
are deposits (D), capital (C) and non-secured
funding (B). When the balance sheet is bal-
anced, total assets equal total liabilities.
L + S= D + C + B
Ehrmann et al (2002) assumed that loan
demand (L
i
d
) depends on the real gross do-
mestic product (y), price levels (p) and loans’
interest rates (i
l 
). The relationship between
price and loan demand is positive. The cor-
relation between output and loan demand is
positive. However, the association between
the interest rates of loans and loan demand
is negative. Therefore, the loan demand func-
tion is as follows:
L
i
d
= a
1
y + a
2
p - a
3
i
l
....................(4)
Loan supply (L
i
s 
) is a function of the
deposits (D), loans’ interest rates ( and a mon-
etary policy variable (interest rates i). The
relationship between deposits and loan sup-
ply is positive. The correlation between loans’
interest rates and loan supply is positive.
However, the association between the inter-
est rate and loan supply is negative. There-
fore, the loan supply function is as follows:
L
i
s
= 
i
D
i
 + a
4
i
l
 - a
5
i......................(5)
They assumed that the coefficient of depos-
its (
i
) is a function of  bank characteristics.
The lower the coefficient of deposits, the
higher the bank characteristics (
i
), which in-
clude banks’ size, liquidity and capital.

i
= 
0
 - 
1

i
In the clearing market, loan demand equals
loan supply.
L
i
d
= L
i
s
a
1
y + a
2
p - a
3
i
l
= 
i
D
i
 + a
4
i
l
 - a
5
i
The equation of profit is as follows:
= Li
l
 + Si
s
 - Bi
b
 - 
After profit maximization, the equation of
loan is as follows:
L
it 
= ay
t 
+
 
b inf
t 
-
 
c
1
i
t 
+
 
c
2
i
t

it 
+
d
it 
+
 
const...............................(6)
where: c
1
 represents the coefficient of mon-
etary policy, c
2
 represents the coefficient of
monetary policy and bank characteristics and
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
i
 represents bank characteristics [total assets
(A), liquidity (Lq) and capital (C)]. The equa-
tion of the nominal interest rate shows that
nominal the interest rate (i) equals the real
interest rate plus inflation.
i= r + inf
Therefore, the equation of the real interest
rate could be written as follows:
r= i - inf, or -r= inf - i ....................(7)
From Equation 6 and Equation 7, the equa-
tion of loans could be written as follows:
L
i,t
=
 
ay
t 
-
 
c
r
r
t 
+
 
c
2
i
t

i,t 
+
 
d
i,t 
+
 
const......(8)
The bank characteristics (
it
) are deter-
mined by three elements: the size of the banks
(S
it
), their liquidity (Lq
it
) and capitalization
(Cap). The banks’ size is measured by total
assets(A
it
). The liquidity (Lq
it
) is measured by
the ratio of liquidity (cash, lending and secu-
rities) to total assets (A
it
). Capitalization is
defined as the ratio of  capital and reserves
(C
it
) to total assets (A
it
). Most of the empiri-
cal studies support the importance of the
banks’ size, liquidity and capital in investi-
gating the response of loans to monetary
policy shocks. Banks with a small size, less
liquidity and less capital are more responsive
to monetary policy shocks than large banks.
By substituting bank characteristics (
it
) in
Equation 6 with total assets (S
it
), liquidity
(Lq
it
) and capitalization (Cap
it
), the new equa-
tion of loans could be written as follows:
L
it
=
 
L
it-1 
+
 
aY
t 
+
 
b inf
t 
-
 
c
1
i
t 
+
 
c
2
i
t
A
it 
+
c
3
i
t
Lq
it 
+ c
4
i
t
Cap
it 
+ d
1
A
it 
+
d
2
Lq
it 
+ d
3
Cap
it 
+ 
it 
+ 
it 
+ 
it 
.......(9)
In Equation 9, (L
it-1
) is a predetermined
variable. The lagged dependent variable (L
it-1
)
is added to Equation 9 for two reasons. Firstly,
lagged loans affect current loans. If  the bank
had increased its loans in the past, the ability
of the bank to expand current loans would
be reduced. Secondly, the lagged loans are
added to change the equation to a dynamic
version. This is because the GMM model deals
with dynamic dependant variables. From
Equation 7 and Equation 9, the equation of
loans could be written as follows:
L
it
=
 
L
it-1 
+
 
aY
t 
+
 
c
r
r
t  
+
 
 
 
c
2
i
t
A
it 
+ c
3
i
t
Lq
it 
+
c
4
i
t
Cap
it 
+ d
1
A
it 
+ d
2
Lq
it 
+ d
3
Cap
it 
+

it 
+ 
it 
+ 
it 
..................................(10)
In loan Equation (9 or 10), the bank
lending channel explains the relationship be-
tween monetary policy and bank loans, using
the traditional interest rate and external fi-
nance premium. The traditional interest rate
is represented by the interest rate. The exter-
nal finance premium is represented by the
banks’ size (S
it
), liquidity (Lq
it
) and capitali-
zation (Cap
it
). The interaction between the
traditional interest rate and external finance
premium is represented by the interaction be-
tween the interest rate and the banks’ size,
liquidity and capitalization. Therefore, the
bank lending channel is represented by three
channels at the firm-level: the interest rate,
bank characteristics (banks’ size, liquidity and
capitalization) and the interaction between
them. As a result, using bank-level data is
more suitable than using macro-level data in
studying the bank lending channel of mon-
etary policy because it captures these three
channels.
Total assets, liquidity and capital are en-
dogenous variables because they are deter-
mined inside the model. Output, inflation and
interest rates are exogenous variables because
they are determined outside the model. For
instance, the interest rate represents a mone-
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tary policy variable that is determined by the
monetary authorities (Central Bank and Minis-
try of  Finance). Table 1 shows dependent,
predetermined, endogenous and exogenous
variables. Output (y) and inflation (inf) have
a positive relationship with loans (L). For in-
stance, an increase in output leads to higher
employment, income, consumption, invest-
ment and profit. A rise in consumption and
investment boosts loan demand and increases
total loans. The correlation between interest
rates (i), as a monetary policy variable, and
loans is negative. The association between
total assets(A
it
), liquidity (Lq
it
), capital (C
it
)
and loans is positive. Output, total assets, li-
quidity and capital are used in the log form,
whereas, inflation and interest rates are used
in the percentage form.
The independent variables consist of
macro and bank specific variables. The macro
level variables (time series variables) are out-
put, inflation, and interest rates, and the firm
level variables are the size of the banks, and
their liquidity and capital. The macro level
variables are included in the equation because
changes in these variables affect loans accord-
ing to the standard bank loan model. Thus,
the macro economics variables are expected
to affect the individual banks’ loan supply.
For example, when the central bank changes
the interest rate, the banks will response by
adjusting their loan supply. However, small
banks are more sensitive to monetary policy
shocks than large banks, because of asym-
metric information, agency cost and the
banks’ financial position. Many previous stud-
ies have considered both macro and firm level
variables in modeling the determinants of  the
bank loan supply, for example Ehrmann et
al. (2002), Hosono (2006) and Abdul Karim
et al. (2011). These studies believed that the
macroeconomic environment and bank spe-
cific variables are important factors in influ-
encing the behaviour of the bank loan sup-
ply.
Methods
This research studies the effect of in-
terest rates on bank loans in Egypt, using the
GMM model and unbalanced panel data. The
data set consists of 32 commercial banks for
the period from 1998 to 2011, obtained from
bank scope, the International Monetary Fund
and the Central Bank of  Egypt4. There are
several reasons for the selection of the com-
mercial banks in examining how relevant is
the bank lending channel of monetary policy
4 In 2005, there were 57 banks in Egypt, which were then reduced to 41 banks in 2008 and to 39 banks in 2010 and
2011. In 2012, there were 40 banks that could be categorized into four groups; 3 public commercial banks, 27 private &
joint venture banks, 7 foreign banks and 3 specialized banks.
Table 1. Dependent and Independent Variables
Independent Variables
Dependent Predetermine Endogenous Exogenous
Variable Variable Variables Variables
Loans L
it
L
it-1
Size of banks (S
it
), Output (Y
t
), inflation (inf
t
),
liquidity (Lq
it
) and and interest rate (i
t
)
capitalization (Cap
it
).
265
Gadjah Mada International Journal of  Business – September-December, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2014
in Egypt. First, in Egypt, commercial banks
play a vital role as financial intermediaries as
compared with others financial intermediar-
ies. For example, the size of  the loans and
deposits of commercial banks is relatively
larger than those of  other financial interme-
diaries. Commercial banks represent 68 per-
cent of  all the banks and the biggest five
banks in Egypt are commercial banks.  There-
fore, it is expected that the loans of the com-
mercial banks will respond immediately, fol-
lowing any monetary policy changes. Second,
the commercial banks can also create or de-
stroy the money in the market by changing
their asset and liabilities. For example, dur-
ing a monetary contraction (an increase in
interest rates), the commercial banks will
downsize their loan activities (assets), result-
ing in less money creation (through deposits)
in the market.
GMM Model
The Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) was introduced by Arellano and Bond
(1991), Arel lano and Bover (1995) and
Blundell and Bond (1998). The GMM model
is consistent within a specific situation char-
acterized by a small time period (T), large
individuals (N), a linear relationship between
variables, a dynamic single dependant vari-
able, independent variables that are not
strictly exogenous, a fixed individual effect
and no autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity
within individuals. Furthermore, the GMM
accommodates unbalanced panels data and
multiple endogenous variables as well as
avoiding the dynamic panel bias (Roodman
2006, 2009).
There are four reasons for using the
GMM technique in studying the bank lend-
ing channel of  monetary policy in Egypt.
Firstly, the GMM technique is a better method
for solving the endogeneity problem of the
explanatory variables, in terms of  the corre-
lation between the lagged dependent variable
(L
i,t-1
) and the fixed effect (
i
). Secondly, the
GMM technique has the advantage of ad-
dressing the Nickell (1981) bias, which re-
sults from the relationship between the fixed
effect and the independent variables, in a set
of panel data that has a small number of time
periods and a large number of  individuals.
Thirdly, the GMM technique is a suitable
method for analyzing the panel data of the
bank lending channel. Finally, this technique
also can investigate the relationship between
the monetary policy variable (interest rates),
the bank characteristics variables (assets, li-
quidity and capital), and the interaction be-
tween monetary policy and bank characteris-
tics, and the banks’ loan supply.
Three assumptions are related to the
explanatory variables in the GMM model.
Firstly, the explanatory variables could be a
predetermined variable that is related to a past
error term. Secondly, the explanatory variables
could be endogenous variables that are re-
lated to past and present error terms. Thirdly,
the explanatory variables could be exogenous
variables that are not correlated with past,
present or future error terms (Karim et al.
2012).
In Equation 10, loans (L
i,t
) are a func-
tion of  the lagged loans (L
i,t-1
), output (y), in-
flation (inf), interest rate (i
t
), bank character-
istics (c
i,t
) and the interaction between the in-
terest rate and bank characteristics (ic
i,t
). L
i,t
:
is the dependent variable, and L
i,t-1
: is a pre-
determined variable or lagged dependent
variable. Output, inflation and interest rates
(y, inf, i) are exogenous variables and bank
characteristics (c
i,t
) are endogenous variables.
L
i,t
= L
i,t-1 
+
 
ay
t 
+
 
b inf
t 
-
 
c
1
i
t 
+
 
c
2
i
t

i,t
 +
d
i,t
 + 
it
 + 
i,t
.........................(10)
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
it
= 
i,t
 + 
i,t
E(
i,t
)= E(
i,t
)= E(
i

i,t
)= 0
In Equation 10, the disturbance term
(
it
) has two components: a fixed effect (
it
)
and idiosyncratic shocks (
it
). One problem
in applying OLS is the correlation between
the lagged dependent variable (L
i-1
) and the
fixed effect (
it
). The GMM solves this prob-
lem by using the first difference. The first dif-
ference transformation (difference GMM) is
used to remove the fixed effect (
it
) from the
Equation 10. The transformed equation is as
follows:
L
i,t
= L
i,t-1 
+
 
ay
t 
+
 
binf
t 
-
 
c
1
i
t 
+
c
2
i
t

i,t
 + d
i,t
 + 
i,t
where: L
i,t-1
= L
i,t-1
 - L
i,t-2
 
i,t
= 
i,t
-
i,t-1
Although this method removes the fixed
effect (
it
) from the loans’ equation, there is
a correlation between the lagged loans (L
i,t-
1
) and idiosyncratic shocks (
i,t
). Therefore,
the system GMM model that includes lagged
levels and difference variables was used to
address this problem.
According to Blundell and Bond (1998),
the lagged levels are weak instruments for
transforming the equation. Therefore, they
developed a new approach that combines the
lagged levels and differences, known as the
system GMM model  (Roodman 2006).
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998) used the regression in difference
and level together to reduce defects of re-
gression in difference, which are biased and
imprecise. The instruments of  regression in
level are the lagged differences and the in-
struments of  regression in difference are the
lagged levels (Beck and Levine 2004). In the
system GMM, both lagged levels and differ-
ences are used as instruments for the regres-
sion in difference and level, respectively.
The current study uses the system GMM
model which is better than the difference
GMM because the system GMM combines
levels and differences. In addition, this study
uses the one-step and two-step system GMM.
As mentioned by Bond (2002), the results of
the one-step GMM are better than the two-
step GMM when standard errors are very
small. However, Windmeijer (2005) argued
that the two-step GMM is better than the
one-step GMM in determining coefficients
with low bias and standard error. This is be-
cause the two-step GMM uses finite sample
corrected standard errors (Abdul Karim et al.
2011; Roodman 2009; Windmeijer 2006).
The system GMM generates many instru-
ments that over-fit the endogenous variables
and weaken the Hansen Test. This problem
is called instrument proliferation. This study
uses two methods to decrease the number of
instruments. The first method is using a cer-
tain lag of  instruments instead of  all the lags.
The second method is  combining instru-
ments into smaller sets by collapsing the block
of  instruments (Abdul Karim et al. 2011;
Roodman 2009).
Variables
The variables are the net loans, total
assets, liquidity, capital, output, inflation and
interest rate. Loans are a dependent variable
and the other variables are independent vari-
ables. The macroeconomics variables are out-
put, inflation and interest rate. They are ob-
tained from the International Monetary Fund
(IFS) and the Central Bank of  Egypt (CBE).
The real gross domestic product (GDP) was
selected as a proxy for output. The interbank
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interest rate was selected as a proxy for mon-
etary policy variable and the percentage
change in consumer price index (CPI) was
selected as a proxy for inflation. The firm
variables are the net loans, total assets, liquid-
ity and capital. Total assets represent the size
of the banks and securities represent liquid-
ity as the quantum of liquidity is not avail-
able in Egyptian banks. Equities represent
the value of capital because its quantum is
also not available in Egyptian banks. The
firm-level data is collected from the bank
scope for the period from 1998 to 2011.
Output, net loans, total assets, liquidity and
securities are used in log form. Inflation and
interest rates are used in percentage form.
The Results
Full Sample
Tables (2 and 3) show the relationship
between loans, as the dependent variable, and
the independent variables, namely the lagged
loans, interest rate, output (GDP), inflation
as well as the interaction between the inter-
est rate and bank characteristics (total assets,
equities and securities). The number of in-
struments is less than the number of  groups.
Arellano-Bond AR (1) test is less than 10
percent. Arellano-Bond AR (2) and Hansen
tests are higher than 10 percent in one-step
and two-step estimations, which implies that
Table 2. System GMM Estimation (Whole Sample)
Two-step Estimation One-step Estimation
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P value Coef. Std. Err. P value
loans
L1. 0.43 0.109 0 *** 0.377 0.113 0.001 ***
Interest rate -0.091 0.039 0.020 ** -0.095 0.037 0.01 ***
Assets x interest 0.42 0.228 0.064 * 0.209 0.207 0.312
Equities x interest 0.13 0.065 0.051 * 0.185 0.059 0.002 ***
Securities x interest -0.04 0.097 0.666 0.007 0.099 0.945
GDP 0.48 0.217 0.027 ** 0.576 0.209 0.006 ***
Inflation 0.03 0.011 0.003 *** 0.037 0.010 0 ***
Cons. -4.709 2.914 0.106 -0.095 0.037 0.059 *
N. of  instruments 29 29
N. of  observations 207 207
Number of groups 32 32
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 0.034 0.009
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 0.715 0.72
Hansen test 0.266 0.0226
Difference 0.252 0.252
Notes: (***) means a significant effect at (1%), (**) means a significant effect at (5%) and (*) means a
significant effect at (10%).
Shokr et al.
268
these tests are statistically insignificant in the
model and there is no autocorrelation be-
tween residuals.
Table 2 shows the estimation results of
the determinants of  the banks’ loans using
one-step and two-step system GMM estima-
tion. Macroeconomic variables, gross domes-
tic product (GDP) and inflation (inf) have a
positive relationship with loans in the one-
step and two-step system GMM estimations.
However, the correlation between interest
rates (i) and loans is negative in the one-step
and two-step estimations. However, the in-
teraction between the interest rate and total
assets has a positive association with loans
in the one-step and two-step estimations.
Also, the interaction between interest rates
and equities has a positive relationship with
loans in the said estimations. On the contrary,
the interaction between the interest rate and
securities shows a negative correlation with
loans in the two-step estimation but is posi-
tive in the one-step estimation.
The relationship between inflation and
loans is significant at one percent significance
level in the one-step and two-step system
estimations. The correlation between GDP
and loans is significant at five percent sig-
nificance level in the two-step and one per-
cent in the one-step estimations. The corre-
lation between interest rates and loans is sig-
nificant at five percent significance level in
the two-step and one percent in the one-step
estimations. Meanwhile, the interaction be-
tween total assets and interest rates is sig-
nificant at ten percent in the two-step, but
insignificant in the one-step estimations. The
interaction between interest rates and equi-
ties is significant at ten percent in the two-
step and one percent in one-step estimations.
Table 3. Difference GMM Estimation (Whole Sample)
Two-step Estimation One-step Estimation
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P value Coef. Std. Err. P value
loans
L1. 0.590 0.085 0 *** 0.582 0.095 0 ***
Interest rate -0.110 0.045 0.015 ** -0.102 0.043 0.018 **
Assets x interest 0.744 0.382 0.052 * 0.700 0.267 0.009 ***
Equities x interest -0.087 0.117 0.456 -0.069 0.104 0.503
Securities x interest -0.203 0.067 0.002 *** -0.189 0.083 0.022 **
GDP 0.553 0.227 0.015 ** 0.409 0.179 0.023 **
Inflation 0.042 0.016 0.008 *** 0.032 0.013 0.012 **
N. of  instruments 29 29
N. of  observations 175 175
Number of groups 32 32
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 0.034 0.009
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 0.715 724
Hansen test 0.266 0.266
Difference 0.252 0.252
Notes: (***) means a significant effect at (1%), (**) means a significant effect at (5%) and (*) means a
significant effect at (10%).
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However, the interaction between the inter-
est rate and securities is insignificant in the
one-step and two-step estimations. For ex-
ample, 1 percent increase in the interest rate
reduces loans by negative 0.091 units in the
two-step and 0.095 units in the one-step es-
timations.  When gross domestic product rises
by one unit, loans go up by 0.48 units in the
two-step and 0.576 units in the one-step es-
timations.
Table 3 shows the estimation results of
the determinants of  the banks’ loans using
the one-step and two-step difference GMM
estimation. The relationship between infla-
tion and loans is significant at one and five
percent significance level in the two-step and
one-step estimations. The correlation be-
tween GDP and loans is significant at five
percent significance level in the two-step and
one-step estimations. The correlation be-
tween interest rates and loans is significant
at five percent significance level in the two-
step and one percent in the one-step estima-
tions. Meanwhile, the interaction between
total assets and interest rates is significant at
ten percent in the two-step and one percent
in the one-step estimations. However, the
interaction between the interest rate and eq-
uities is insignificant in the two-step and one-
step estimations. The interaction between the
interest rate and securities is significant at one
and five percent in the one-step and two-step
estimations. For example, 1 percent increase
in the interest rate reduces loans by negative
(0.110) units in the two-step and (0.102) units
in the one-step estimations.
It is therefore evident that the interest
rate has a significant effect on bank loans.
The macroeconomic variables, namely out-
put and inflation, also have a significant ef-
fect on loans. Further, the interaction be-
tween the interest rate and total assets has a
significant impact on loans. Although the in-
teraction between the interest rate and equi-
ties is significant, the interaction between the
interest rate and securities does not have an
important effect on loans in the system GMM
model.
Subsample
Firstly subsample includes the smallest
27 commercial banks in Egypt based on to-
tal assets, securities and equities, the largest
5 banks are excluded from this sample. Firstly,
the average of their total assets, securities and
equities are estimated for all banks. Secondly,
the total average for all the banks is deter-
mined. Thirdly, the smallest 27 banks are se-
lected and the results are explained in Table
4, whereas, the largest 27 banks results are
explained in Table 5.
Table 4 shows the one-step and two-
step system GMM estimations of the small-
est banks in Egypt based on total assets, se-
curities and equities. The correlation between
inflation and bank loans is significant at one
percent significance level in the one-step and
two-step estimations. The relationship be-
tween interest rates and loans is significant
at one percent in the two-step and five per-
cent in the one-step estimations. The relation-
ship between output and loans is significant
at five percent in the two-step and one per-
cent in the one-step estimations. The inter-
action between the interest rate and total as-
sets is significant at one percent significance
level in the two-step and one-step estima-
tions. However, the interaction between the
interest rate and equities becomes insignifi-
cant in the two-step and one-step estimations,
it is significant in Table 2. The interaction
between interest rates and securities becomes
significant at one percent in the two-step and
one-step estimations, it is insignificant in
Table 2. In the smallest banks sample, 1 per-
cent increase in the interest rate reduces loans
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by negative 0.100 and 0.112 units in the two-
step and one-step estimations, respectively,
they are 0.091 and 0.095 units in the whole
sample. It implies that the response of the
smallest banks to monetary policy shocks is
more effective than the response of other
banks. Therefore, the smallest banks are more
sensitive to monetary policy shocks than
other banks.
Table 5 shows the one-step and two-
step estimations of  the largest banks in Egypt
based on total assets, securities and equities.
The relationship between inflation and loans
is significant at one percent significance level
in the one-step and two-step estimations. The
correlation between interest rates and loans
is insignificant in the two-step but significant
at ten percent significance level in the one-
step estimation. The relationship between
output and loans is significant at one percent
in the two-step and one-step estimations.
Meanwhile, the interaction between the in-
terest rate and total assets is insignificant in
the two-step and one-step estimations. The
interaction between interest rates and equi-
ties is significant at one percent in the two-
step and one-step estimations. However, the
interaction between interest rates and secu-
rities is insignificant in the two-step and one-
step estimations. In the largest banks sample,
1 percent increase in the interest rate leads
to a decrease in loans by negative 0.060 units
Table 4. System GMM Estimation of  the Smallest 27 Banks in Egypt
Two-step Estimation One-step Estimation
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P value Coef. Std. Err. P value
loans
L1. 0.577 0.086 0 *** 0.491 0.112 0 ***
Interest rate -0.100 0.033 0.003 *** -0.112 0.045 0.013 **
Assets x interest 1.063 0.181 0 *** 0.970 0.213 0 ***
Equities x interest -0.048 0.050 0.34 -0.023 0.057 0.682
Securities x interest -0.194 0.044 0 *** -0.182 0.071 0.01 ***
GDP 0.656 0.273 0.016 ** 0.705 0.265 0.008 ***
inflation 0.054 0.012 0 *** 0.053 0.013 0 ***
CONS -11.33 4.89 0.021 ** -10.74 4.297 0.012 **
N. of  instruments 25 35
N. of  observations 171 171
Number of Groups 21 21
Arellano-Bond 0.017 0.088
AR (1) 0.772 0.549
Arellano-Bond 0.524 0.524
AR (2) 0.557 0.557
Hansen test
Difference
Notes: (***) means a significant effect at (1%), (**) means a significant effect at (5%) and (*) means a
significant effect at (10%).
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and 0.080 units in the two-step and one-step
estimations respectively, smaller than the
coefficients of  the smallest banks. Therefore,
the smallest banks are more sensitive to mon-
etary policy shocks than the largest banks.
The existing studies in Egypt, such as
Hassan (2003) and Al-Mashat and Billmerier
(2008), used aggregate data to study the bank
lending channel. They did not support the
effectiveness of the bank lending channel or
the heterogeneity effect of monetary policy
according to the size of  the banks. However,
this study uses a dynamic panel GMM tech-
nique in modeling the determinants of  bank
loan supply, and found the relevance of  the
bank lending channel of monetary policy in
Egypt. Using bank-level data is more suit-
able than using aggregate data, in studying
the bank lending channel, because it treats
banks as heterogeneous and also can capture
these three possible factors that can influence
the lending channels of  monetary policy, ie
the role of interest rates (monetary policy
variable), bank-specific variables (banks’ size,
liquidity and capital), and the interaction be-
tween interest rates and bank-specific vari-
ables. In addition, this study also supports the
heterogeneity of the monetary policy effects
on bank loans according to the difference size
of the banks, in which the small banks are
more sensitive to monetary policy shocks
than the large banks. These results are asso-
ciated with some studies, such as Kashyap
and Stein (1995), Abdul Karim et al. (2011)
Table 5. System GMM Estimation of  the Largest 27 Banks in Egypt
Two-step Estimation One-step Estimation
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P value Coef. Std. Err. P value
loans
L1. 0.642 0.163 0 *** 0.539 0.056 0 ***
Interest rate -0.06 0.039 0.125 -0.08 0.041 0.055 *
Assets x interest 0.036 0.307 0.907 0.207 0.214 0.334
Equities x interest 0.229 0.085 0.007 *** 0.173 0.056 0.002 ***
Securities x interest -0.109 0.114 0.337 -0.117 0.078 0.133
GDP 0.565 0.203 0.005 *** 0.597 0.188 0.001 ***
inflation 0.038 0.011 0.001 *** 0.037 0.012 0.001 ***
CONS -5.322 2.641 0.044 ** -5.651 2.147 0.009 ***
N. of  instruments 25 25
N. of  observations 174 174
Number of Groups 27 27
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 0.072 0.024
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 0.440 0.377
Hansen test 0.977 0.483
Difference 0.375 0.202
Notes: (***) means a significant effect at (1%), (**) means a significant effect at (5%) and (*) means a
significant effect at (10%).
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and Kandra (2012), who support the bank
lending channel and the heterogeneity effect
of  monetary policy.
Summary and Conclusions
Firstly examines the effect of monetary
policy on bank loans using disaggregated data
and the GMM model to ascertain if the bank
lending channel is operative in Egypt. Secondly,
it investigates the importance of  firm level
variables, namely total assets, liquidity and
capi ta l, and macroeconomic variables,
namely output and inflation, in analyzing the
response of  loans to monetary policy shocks.
Finally, it studies the heterogeneity of  mon-
etary policy monetary policy based on the size
of  the banks.
The previous studies in Egypt, such as
Hassan (2003) and Al-Mashat and Billmerier
(2008), used macro level data and did not
support the importance of the bank lending
channel. However, this paper supports the
significant effect of monetary policy on bank
loans. Secondly, it highlights the important
effects of the interaction between interest
rates and total assets on loans. The interac-
tion between interest rates and capital (equi-
ties) is significant, whereas, the interaction
between interest rates and liquidity (securi-
ties) does not have an important effect on
loans. Thirdly, it supports the important im-
pact of  output and inflation on bank loans.
Finally, it sustains the heterogeneity effect of
monetary policy on bank loan according to
the size of  the banks.
The policy implications from this paper
indicate that the monetary authorities should
take cognizance of the stability of interest
rates in order to stabilize the bank loan sup-
ply. By stabilizing the bank loan, the central
bank is able to stabilize the aggregate demand
components that are investment and con-
sumption, with which it can stabilize price
levels and domestic output. Secondly, the
relevance of the bank lending channel indi-
cates that the role of commercial banks is
very important in transmitting monetary
policy shocks to the real sector economy. This
implies that the monetary authorities need to
consider the microeconomics aspect of bank
behavior in formulating their policy. Thirdly,
the heterogeneity effect of the bank lending
channel indicates that the most affected
banks are small banks, which need financial
assistance during a monetary contraction.
Therefore, the small banks need to plan pre-
cisely their assets, liquidity and capital in their
loans to the private sector.
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